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Introduction
The collapse of the American housing market has had deleterious effects on not only the U.S. economy, but also the global economy, plunging much of the world into the worst financial crisis since the 
Great Depression.
In the U.S., a record 3.8 million foreclosure filings (default notices, scheduled auctions, 
and bank repossessions) were reported on 2.8 million properties in 2010.1  This was an 
increase of almost two percent from 2009 and an increase of 23 percent from 2008.2  2.23 
percent of all U.S. housing units received at least one foreclosure filing during 2010.  This 
was up from 2.21 percent in 2009, 1.84 percent in 2008, 1.03 percent in 2007, and 0.58 percent 
in 2006.3  Foreclosures in 2011 were down 34 percent from the previous year – 2.7 million 
filings on 1.45 percent of all housing units – but these numbers still represent levels not seen 
before the recent financial crisis began.4  Moreover, this decrease is largely attributable to 
the documentation and legal issues plaguing the industry; foreclosure activity is actually 
projected to be higher in 2012.5  More than one in four American borrowers are currently 
underwater, and over four million borrowers owe at least twice as much as their homes are 
worth.6
The Bush Administration’s attempts at stemming the foreclosure crisis are widely 
considered unmitigated failures.  In 2007, President Bush announced that the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) would launch a program called FHA-Secure, which would 
allow homeowners with good credit history, but who could not afford their current payments, 
to refinance into FHA-insured mortgages.7  The number of delinquent conventional loans 
refinanced with FHA-insured mortgages was zero in fiscal 2007, 3,794 in fiscal 2008, and 316 
in fiscal 2009 - a total of 4,110.8 
In January 2008 President Bush created Hope for Homeowners, a program that set aside 
$300 billion to refinance toxic loans.9  There were zero loans refinanced in fiscal 2008, 23 in 
fiscal 2009, and 48 in fiscal 2010 - a total of 71 loans over three years.10  A major reason for its 
failure is that lender participation was voluntary and new loans were limited to 90 percent 
of appraised value.  Appraised value had already decreased significantly, so lenders were 
not willing to take losses.
In February 2009, the Obama Administration’s response to the foreclosure crisis was 
1 Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in December, realtytraC, Jan. 12, 2011, http://
www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/record-29-million-us-properties-receive-foreclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-30-month-low-in-de-
cember-6309.
2 Id. 
3 Id.  Nevada has the highest foreclosure rate in the U.S., with more than 9 percent of homes receiving at least one foreclosure filing in 2010. 
Arizona is next, at 5.73 percent, followed by Florida at 5.51 percent.  Overall, five states - California, Florida, Arizona, Illinois, and Michigan 
- account for 51 percent of the nation’s total foreclosure activity in 2010.
4 2011 Year-End Foreclosure Report: Foreclosures on the Retreat, realtytraC, Jan. 9, 2012, http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-
market-report/2011-year-end-foreclosure-market-report-6984.
5 Id.
6 Drowning or waiving: The policy options for alleviating America’s huge negative-equity problem, The Economist, Oct. 21, 2010, http://
www.economist.com/node/17305544.
7 Peter G. Miller, Obama Mortgage Modification Plan ‑‑ 100 Times Better Than Bush, The Huffington Post, Aug. 25, 2010,   http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/peter-g-miller/obama-mortgage-modificati_b_694059.html
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP), designed to help as many as 4 million 
borrowers avoid foreclosure by the end of 2012.  HAMP was the largest part of a broad 
array of programs called Making Home Affordable (MHA), which itself was part of the 
$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailout.  $75 billion was originally set 
aside to fund MHA ($50 billion under TARP and $25 billion from Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac).11  HAMP required participating loan servicers to reduce monthly payments to no 
more than 38 percent of the borrower’s gross monthly income, with the government then 
chipping in to bring the payments down to no more than 31 percent of monthly income.12 
This paper will critique the effectiveness of HAMP and its companion programs, and 
dissect what went wrong.  This will include an analysis of strategic defaults, strategic 
defaults and the motivations of the servicers.  Lastly, this paper will lay out proposed 
solutions and advocate what would have been the best solution from the start.  
I. HAMP & Related Programs 
HAMP is available to qualified borrowers to modify first liens on primary residences 
made before January 1, 2009.  The first-lien mortgage payment must exceed 31 percent of 
the borrower’s gross monthly income.  Only single-family properties with mortgages no 
greater than $729,750 for a one-unit property are eligible.13
Under HAMP, costs are shared between mortgage holders (investors) and the federal 
government.  Investors take the first loss in reducing monthly payments to no more than 
38 percent of the borrower’s monthly income.  Then, the U.S. Treasury uses TARP funds 
to reduce the monthly payment to no more than 31 percent of the borrower’s monthly 
income.14  Modified monthly payments are fixed for five years or until the loan is paid off, 
whichever is earlier, provided that the borrower remains in good standing.15  After five 
years, investors no longer receive cost-sharing payments, and the borrower’s interest rate 
may increase one percent per year up to a pre-determined cap.16  While the borrower’s 
payment would increase because of the higher interest rate, this rate would then remain 
fixed for the remainder of the loan.17
In order to determine whether a loan servicer is required to make a modification, a net 
present value (NPV) model is used, which compares expected cash flows from a modified 
loan to the same loan without a modification.  If the expected cash flows are greater with a 
modification than without, then the servicer is required to modify the loan.18
In order to accomplish the modification, a series of sequential steps are taken until 
the 31 percent debt-to-income threshold is met: reducing the interest rate to as little as 
two percent, extending the terms of the loan to up to 40 years, and finally forbearing loan 
principal at no interest.  HAMP does not require servicers to reduce mortgage principal. 
Before borrowers can receive a permanent modification, they must make payments in a 
three-month trial period, and complete additional paperwork.  To encourage participation, 
servicers are paid $1,000 for each modification and $1,000 each year for three years, as long 
as the borrower continues making payments.19 
11  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Further Actions Needed to Fully and Equitably Implement Foreclosure 
Mitigation Programs 7 (2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10634.pdf [hereinafter Further Actions Needed].
12 Drowning or waiving: The policy options for alleviating America’s huge negative-equity problem, supra note 6.
13  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Making Home Affordable Program Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages (Version 3.0) 41-44 
(2010), https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_30.pdf, [hereinafter MHA Handbook]. While MHA 
applies to both government sponsored entity (GSE) and Non-GSE mortgages, this is the only publically available handbook with the various 
programs’ specific details. Treasury advises servicers of mortgage loans that are owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to refer to 
any relevant guidance issued by the applicable GSE. 
14 Id. at 65-67.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 66, 94.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 73-77.
19 Id. at 92-93.
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A.  Results and Problems
HAMP is premised on the notion that homeowners will continue to make their 
monthly payments as long as they can afford to do so, regardless of how much negative 
equity they have in their home - this is its fundamental flaw.  Home prices have dropped 
33 percent from their 2006 peak.20  As a result, more than one in four homes is currently 
underwater.21  In 2009, researchers estimated that 26 percent of defaults are strategic.22  As 
such, if homeowners owe more than the house is worth, they have an incentive to default. 
Thus far, principal has been reduced for only around six percent of HAMP cases.23  Strategic 
defaults are discussed in more detail in Part II.
HAMP was also launched before being fully developed, which led to confusion and 
delays.  Homeowners were put into trial modifications before servicers collected the 
required documentation.24  This created a backlog of trial modifications, a great deal of 
which never became permanent.  When the program initially got off to a slow start, the 
Treasury permitted servicers to enroll borrowers using stated income.  As such, four of the 
five largest HAMP servicers relied on stated income to determine HAMP eligibility. 25  A 
JP Morgan Chase official told a congressional committee in December 2009 that while 71 
percent of the firm’s modified borrowers made all three trial payments, 72 percent of those 
failed to adequately produce the required documents for conversion into a permanent 
modification.26  In January 2010, the guidelines were changed to require servicers to gather 
documented financial information before placing borrowers into trial modifications.27
HAMP has also come under fire for not being marketed properly.28  For example, it 
took the Treasury more than one year to develop its own public service announcements.29 
Meanwhile, officials conduct no oversight of servicers’ marketing efforts.  As of November 
2009, less than half the participating servicers’ websites even contained information about 
HAMP, and only a little more than one-third provided a link to the Making Home Affordable 
website.  Additionally, the Treasury outsourced the responsibility for overseeing servicers 
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, even though both companies have business relationships 
with the same servicers.  This calls into question their impartiality and thus their ability to 
conduct stringent oversight.
2.82 million U.S. homeowners lost their properties to foreclosure in 2009.30  As of 
February 2010, one year into the program, only 168,708 trial plans had been converted into 
permanent revisions, 1,421 of which had already defaulted.  835,194 more borrowers had 
received trial modifications.31  Wells Fargo, which had 379,357 eligible loans, led mortgage 
servicers in permanent modifications with 24,975 borrowers in such plans.  Bank of 
America, despite accounting for almost one-third of the 3.4 million borrowers eligible for 
20 Average Home Price One-Third Below Peak 2006 Levels, National Mortgage Professional Magazine,  Jan. 30, 2012, http://nationalmort-
gageprofessional.com/news28185/average-home-price-one-third-below-peak-2006-levels.
21 Octavio Nuiry, Strategic Default “Only Choice” For Some, realtytraC, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.realtytrac.com/content/news-and-opin-
ion/strategic-default-only-choice-for-some-6989
22 Id.
23  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report Through December 2011 2, 7 (2012), www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/Dec%202011%20MHA%20Report%20FINAL.PDF.
24  Office of  the Special  Inspector General  for  the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Factors Affecting Implementation of  the Home Afford-
able Modification  Program  13  (2010),  http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2010/Factors_Affecting_Implementation_of_the_Home_Afford-
able_Modification_Program.pdf.
25 Id.
26 Luke Mullins, Obama Housing Rescue Whiffs on ‘Underwater’ Headaches, U.S. News and World Report, Dec. 8, 2009, http://money.
usnews.com/money/blogs/the-home-front/2009/12/08/obama-housing-rescue-whiffs-on-underwater-headaches.
27 Tami Luhby, TARP watchdog slams Obama foreclosure program, Cnnmoney, Mar. 24, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/23/real_es-
tate/sigtarp_foreclosure/index.htm?postversion=201003.
28 Id.
29 Factors Affecting Implementation of the Home Affordable Modification Program, supra note 24 at 27.
30 Don Jeffrey, Loan Modification Plan Sheds 8 Percent of Borrowers, Bloomberg Businessweek, Mar. 12, 2010,  http://www.businessweek.
com/news/2010-03-12/loan-modification-plan-sheds-8-percent-of-borrowers-correct-.html.
31  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program Servicer Performance Report Through February 2010 4 (2010), http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/Feb%20Report%20031210.pdf.
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the program, placed second with just 20,666 borrowers in permanent modifications.  JP 
Morgan, which had 437,323 eligible loans, modified 19,385.32 
It was not until March 2010 that the Obama administration announced new mortgage 
modification steps.  In a seeming admission of the failure of the program’s voluntary 
nature, the federal government doubled the incentive for servicers to complete a HAMP 
modification, increasing it to $2,000.33  It was at the same time that new programs were 
introduced, including a principal reduction program available for HAMP-eligible borrowers 
who owe more than 115 percent of their home’s current value, which is discussed in more 
detail below.  In addition, the federal government unveiled a program to aid the unemployed 
that required servicers to offer forbearance plans to all qualified jobless borrowers for three 
to six months.34
Through June 2010, over 40 percent of the 1.28 million borrowers who had enrolled in 
HAMP had dropped out.35  By September 2010, 51 percent of the borrowers in HAMP had 
dropped out.36  The number of borrowers in permanent modifications was only 466,708. 
Those homeowners realized a median monthly payment reduction of 36 percent, or around 
$520 per month.37
A December 2010 Congressional Oversight Panel report predicted that HAMP will 
ultimately help just 700,000 borrowers, far short of the initial 4 million goal.38  Treasury 
officials now claim that the initial goal applied only to offering trial modifications, as 
opposed to permanent help.39  Additionally, officials are now taking credit for private loan 
modifications completely outside of the HAMP process.40  It also appears that instead of 
the originally allotted $75 billion for all of MHA, only $4 billion will ultimately be spent. 
The Treasury has since reduced its obligation of TARP funds to $45.6 billion, of which $29.9 
billion is allocated to MHA and $15.7 billion is allocated to a FHA refinancing program and 
a state housing finance agency grant program.41  Of the $29.9 billion allocated to MHA, the 
first-lien modification  portion of HAMP is allocated as $19.1 billion.42  By the end of 2010, 
the Treasury had only made HAMP incentive payments of less than $800 million.43  This 
number had risen to $1.8 billion by the end of 2011, but it was still far short of the allocated 
$19.1 billion.44  Through November 2011, more homeowners had been denied permanent 
HAMP modifications than had received permanent modifications.45  This trend reversed 
for the first time in December 2011, but only barely.46  To be specific, there were there were 
762,839 active permanent modifications, 761,961 trial modifications cancelled,47 170,488 
32 Id. at 7.  
33 Tami Luhby, Obama expands mortgage modification effort, CNNMoney, Mar. 26, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/26/news/economy/
Obama_mortgage_relief/.
34 Id.
35  U.S. Dep’t of  the Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program Servicer Performance Report Through June 2010 2 (2010), http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/June%20MHA%20Public%20Revised%20080610.pdf.
36  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program Servicer Performance Report Through September 2010 2 (2010), http://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/Sept%20MHA%20Public%202010.pdf.
37 Id. at 3.
38 Meena Thiruvengadam, Oversight Panel: Obama’s Mortgage Modification Program Falls Short, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 14, 2010, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2010/12/14/oversight-panel-obamas-mortgage-modification-program-falls-short/.
39 Matthew Jaffe, Mortgage Modification Program’s Definition of  Success Called  ‘Essentially Meaningless’, ABC News, Mar. 23, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/mortgage-modification-program-criticized-watchdog/story?id=10184813.
40 Arthur Delaney, HAMP: White House Doubles Down On Mortgage Modification Spin, The Huffington Post, Dec. 18, 2011, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/18/white-house-hamp_n_1016420.html?ir=Business.
41  Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Quarterly Report To Congress (January 26, 2012) 57 (2012), 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2012/January_26_2012_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
42 Id.
43 Thiruvengadam supra note 38.
44 Quarterly Report To Congress (January 26, 2012), supra note 41.
45  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report Through November 2011 2 (2012), http://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/FINAL_Nov%202011%20MHA%20Report.pdf.
46 Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report Through December 2011, supra note 23 at 2.
47  Curiously, the cumulative number of trial modifications cancelled dropped from 764,340 in November 2011, which in turn dropped from a 
high of 767,321 in October 2011.  This would appear to be an inapposite result.  Using the high point in October, the number of trial modifica-
tions cancelled would still exceed the number made permanent.  Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report Through November 
2011, supra note 45; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report Through October 2011 2 (2011), http://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/October%202011%20MHA%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
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permanent modifications cancelled, and 79,307 active trial modifications.48  The number 
of new trial starts per month had also consistently fallen throughout the year.49  While the 
Obama administration announced in January 2012 that the deadline for homeowners to 
apply for a HAMP modification had been pushed back one year, to December 31, 2013,50 
less than 900,000 homeowners even remain eligible.51
A glaring problem for HAMP is that the Treasury has failed to provide specific 
guidelines for servicers to follow.  By lacking uniform standards, there is a high possibility 
for inequitable treatment of borrowers due to inconsistent outcomes.  For example, the 
Treasury did not issue guidelines for soliciting borrowers until one year after announcing 
the program.52  Some servicers solicited borrowers after they were 31 days late on their 
payments, while others waited 60 days.53  Additionally, although the Treasury had 
emphasized the importance of reaching out to borrowers before they default, there are 
no guidelines as to when a borrower is in “imminent default.”54  Out of the ten servicers 
evaluated by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), seven used different sets of 
criteria for determining whether a borrower is in “imminent default.”55
The Treasury has also not specified the consequences of a servicer not complying 
with the program requirements.  As such, unsurprisingly the Treasury has yet to fine any 
servicers for non-compliance.  This is despite the fact that the GAO advised the Treasury in a 
July 2009 report to implement policies, procedures, and guidelines for program activities.56
In fact, the GAO found that 15 out of the largest 20 servicers did not comply with various 
aspects of the program guidelines for determining the NPV.57  This is critical because the 
NPV test determines whether or not a borrower is eligible for a HAMP modification.  As 
a result of the errors in running the test, there could be thousands of borrowers who were 
incorrectly denied modifications.  Some servicers have even charged fees to borrowers that 
were prohibited by HAMP guidelines. 
The GAO also found numerous other errors being committed by servicers.  Half of 
the servicers evaluated experienced a 20 percent error rate for calculating borrower 
income.  The servicers’ own established error thresholds were approximately three to five 
percent.58  Without accurate income similar borrowers may be inaccurately deemed eligible 
or ineligible.  Out of the ten servicers evaluated, six did not properly test their results to 
ensure compliance.  Four servicers could not always provide evidence that potentially 
eligible borrowers that were supposed to be solicited were in fact solicited.  There was 
also inconsistency in how complaints were tracked.  Some servicers tracked all and some 
tracked only a subset.59  
The GAO concluded that the Treasury’s goal should be to “create uniform, clear, and 
consistent guidance for loan modifications across the servicing industry.”60  They noted 
that the Treasury should also do more to hold servicers accountable, such as establishing 
benchmarks that they expect servicers to meet.
Oversight efforts remained secretive until June 2011, when the Treasury began publishing 
quarterly assessments of the ten largest servicers, measuring such things as error rates for 
48 Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report Through December 2011, supra note 23.
49 Id.
50 Jon Prior, Treasury to pay investors triple for HAMP principle reductions, HousingWire, Jan. 27, 2012, http://www.housingwire.com/
node/32363.
51 Id.
52 Further Actions Needed, supra note 11 at 14.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 18.
55 Id.
56  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Treasury Actions Needed to Make the Home Affordable Modification 
Program More Transparent and Accountable 50-51 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09837.pdf.
57 Further Actions Needed, supra note 11 at 20.
58 Id. at 21.
59 Id. at 23.
60 Id. at 17.
Cornell Real Estate REview
59
calculating borrowers’ income.61  Four servicers were determined to need “substantial” 
improvement for the first quarter of 2011, and financial incentives were withheld from three 
of them – Bank of America, Chase, and Wells Fargo.62  However, these banks had already 
been paid more than $77 million, $84 million, and $68 million, respectively, for their roles as 
servicers.63  Moreover, these sanctions did not come until more than two years after HAMP 
began, and after a majority of homeowners eligible for a modification – about three million 
– had already been evaluated.64  Homeowners that were improperly denied a modification 
due to such servicer error have no recourse, and presumably many have already lost their 
homes.  As of the third quarter of 2011, Chase and Bank of America are still having their 
incentives withheld, with the former still needing “substantial” improvement.65
Modifications often leave homeowners in a worse position than they were before 
modification.  The Congressional Oversight Panel found that 95 percent of HAMP 
participants end up with higher principal balances after receiving a modification.66  This is 
because the modification process allows lenders to capitalize past-due interest, various fees, 
and escrow advances.  So, while borrowers might have smaller monthly payments, those 
payments are stretched over a longer period and would result in a bigger total balance owed 
in the end.  This is even more significant considering that 76 percent of all homeowners 
in HAMP have negative equity in their home.  Borrowers in trial modifications have an 
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 123 percent, while those in permanent modifications 
have an average LTV ratio of 128 percent.67  While principal has been reduced under HAMP 
for only two percent of homeowners, before HAMP mortgage servicers were reducing 
principal in about ten percent of modifications.68
The situation is even worse for those homeowners whose trial modifications ultimately 
failed.  Servicers are permitted to impose on these homeowners back payments, penalties, 
and late fees that become due once the modification ends, even if these homeowners 
never missed a payment.69  In essence, they are being penalized for attempting HAMP. 
The impact of these burdens is even greater when trial modifications continue past the 
three-month period.70  In fact, that is often the case.  At the peak in May 2010, 190,000 
homeowners were still in trial modifications that were initiated at least six months earlier.71 
At the time, this was approximately 40 percent of all active trials.  By December 2010, there 
was still a backlog of 40,000 trials lasting longer than six months.72  By November 2011, the 
backlog numbered over 20,000.73  Considering that there are more failed modifications than 
permanent modifications, it is not far-fetched to say that HAMP has hurt more homeowners 
than it has helped. 
61  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report Through April 2011 14 (2011), http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/April%202011%20MHA%20Report%20FINAL.PDF.
62 Id.
63  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Home Affordable Modification Non-GSE Incentive Payments (Through May 2011) 1-2 (2011), http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/briefing-room/reports/tarp-transactions/DocumentsTARPTransactions/HAMP%20Transactions%20
Report%20as%20of%2006.03.2011-Final.pdf.
64 Paul Kiel, Secret Docs Show Foreclosure Watchdog Doesn’t Bark or Bite, ProPublica, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.propublica.org/article/
secret-docs-on-foreclosure-watchdog.
65  U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report Through October 2011 18 (2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/October%202011%20MHA%20Report%20FINAL.
pdf. 
66 Shahien Nasiripour, Obama’s Foreclosure Program Will Reach Less Than One Quarter Of Administration’s Target, The Huffington Post, 
Dec. 14, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/14/obama-anti-foreclosure-program_n_796629.html.
67  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Treasury Continues to Face Implementation Challenges and Data Weaknesses in Its Making Home Af-
fordable Program ii (2011), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11288.pdf, [hereinafter Treasury Continues to Face Implementation Challenges].
68  Factors Affecting Implementation of the Home Affordable Modification Program, supra note 24 at 17.
69 Statement of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector General Troubled Asset Relief Program, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Development 13, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/testimony/2011/Testimony%20Before%20the%20Senate%20Com-
mittee%20on%20Banking,%20Housing%20and%20Urban%20Development.pdf.
70 Id.
71  U.S. Dep’t of  the Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program Servicer Performance Report Through May 2010 1 (2010), http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/May%20MHA%20Public%20062110.pdf.
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HAMP has also negatively affected credit scores. For the first six months of the program, 
lenders used an existing code when providing information to the credit bureaus to signal 
that borrowers were participating in the program.74  The problem is that the existing code 
signaled that a customer had only made a partial payment, despite the fact that they paid 
the full amount they were directed to pay under HAMP.  The Treasury estimated that use of 
the old code could have lowered the credit scores of participants anywhere from 30 to 100 
points.  It was not until November 2010 that a new code that would not negatively impact 
credit scores was developed to indicate that borrowers were participating in HAMP.
The most recent data indicates that HAMP modifications are actually about half as 
likely to redefault as other modifications implemented during the same period.75  For 
example, for loans modified in the first quarter of 2010, the redefault rate nine months later 
was 17.4 percent for HAMP modifications and 31.9 percent for other modifications.76  This 
is attributable to HAMP’s emphasis on the affordability of its monthly payments.  HAMP 
modifications during that quarter reduced monthly payments by an average of $591 while 
other modifications reduced monthly payments by just $233.77  However, this result should 
not be particularly surprising because if other modifications were effective, there would be 
no need for HAMP in the first place.  The real story is not that HAMP is better than nothing, 
but rather that HAMP has serious flaws in its design, management, and execution that 
leads to both a significant redefault rate on its own and also a failure to provide any form of 
assistance whatsoever to millions of homeowners.  The criticism against HAMP has been so 
strong that in late March 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 252-170 to terminate 
HAMP.78  However, the bill is unlikely to pass the Senate (over a year later, it is still stuck in 
committee), and even if it did President Obama has threatened to veto it.79
B.  Second Lien Modification Program (2MP)
It has been estimated that as many as half of at-risk mortgages have second liens.80 
Any savings on the primary mortgage could end up going straight to the second-lien bill 
collector.  The Second Lien Modification Program (2MP) provides incentives for second-
lien holders to modify or extinguish a second-lien mortgage after a HAMP modification has 
been started on the property’s first-lien mortgage.81  Servicers who agree to participate are 
required to offer to modify the second lien according to a defined protocol.  Modifications 
work similarly to as they do under HAMP, and interest rates are generally reduced to 
one percent and the loan term extended to match the term of the HAMP-modified first 
lien.   Additionally, if the HAMP modification included principal forgiveness, the 2MP 
modification must forgive principal in the same proportion.82  Servicers receive $500 for 
each 2MP modification as well as $250 per year for up to three years.  The Treasury provides 
a lump-sum payment to investors in exchange for full extinguishment of the second lien, 
or a lesser lump-sum payment in exchange for a partial extinguishment and modification 
of the second lien.83  
2MP was first announced at the same time as the introduction of HAMP in March 
2009.  However, it was not until January 2010 that the first servicer signed the first 
74  Mortgage Modifications Affect Credit Scores, N.Y. Times,  Jan. 5, 2010, http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/how-loan-modifica-
tions-impact-credit-scores/.
75 Id. at 36.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 31.
78 The HAMP Termination Act of 2011, H.R. 839, 112th Cong. (2011).
79 Matthew Jaffe and John R. Parkinson, GOP House Terminates Dems’ Foreclosure Prevention Program, ABC News, Mar. 29, 2011, http://
blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/2011/03/gop-house-terminates-dems-foreclosure-prevention-program.html.
80 Mullins, supra note 26.
81 MHA Handbook, supra note 13 at 119.
82 Id. at 121-127.
83 Id. at 137-138.
Cornell Real Estate REview
61
agreement to participate.84  2MP was not implemented until one year later, in March 2010. 
As of November 2010, 17 servicers were participating, which represents two-thirds of the 
second-lien mortgage market.85 The GAO contacted five servicers, which represented the 
majority of potential covered second liens, and only one had actually begun doing 2MP 
modifications 18 months after the program was announced.  Despite a funding allocation 
of $133 million, by the end of 2010 only $2.9 million in incentives had been paId.86  This 
number had risen, though, to $95.6 million by the end of 2011.87  Servicers complained to the 
GAO that the program started slowly due to problems with the database that the Treasury 
required them to use to identify potentially eligible loans.  The purpose of the database is 
to inform second-lien servicers when the corresponding first lien has been modified under 
HAMP.  However, the accuracy and completeness of the data has been called into question 
by the servicers, citing everything from differences in abbreviations and spacings that could 
prevent matches from being found to outright wrong data.  
In addition, borrowers might not be aware that they are eligible for the program. 
The Treasury does not even require first-lien servicers to inform homeowners about their 
potential eligibility for 2MP.88  Delays or omissions in modifying the second lien increase 
the likelihood that borrowers will be unable to maintain their monthly payments and may 
ultimately redefault on their HAMP-modified first lien.    
 Another problem has been the lack of clear guidelines by the Treasury.  2MP was 
announced in March 2009, but specific guidelines were not published until August 2009. 
In March 2010, the first month of implementation, revisions to the guidelines were issued. 
Further revisions were issued in June and November of 2010.89  Program revisions present 
the challenge of retraining staff and delayed the program’s implementation.
C.  Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) 
The Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) program provides incentives 
for short sales and deeds in lieu of foreclosure as alternatives for borrowers who are either 
unable or unwilling to carry out the HAMP first-lien modification process.90  Servicers 
receive $1,500 for completing a short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, while borrowers 
receive $3,000 for relocation assistance.  Investors are also paid up to $2,000 for allowing 
short-sale proceeds to be distributed to subordinate lien holders.91  If a borrower cannot 
be approved for HAMP, does not accept a HAMP modification, or defaults on a HAMP 
modification, then the servicer is required to evaluate them for HAFA.  HAFA applies to 
mortgages owned or guaranteed by all non-GSE’s, as well as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
FHA, VA, and USDA Rural Development have their own short-sale programs and are not 
participating in HAFA.92
HAFA, like 2MP, was also originally announced back in March 2009.  It was not 
implemented, however, until April 2010.  Like the slow start to the second-lien program, 
despite a funding allocation of $4.1 billion, only $9.5 million in incentives had been paid 
under HAFA by the end of 2010.93   The amount had risen to only $99.5 million by the end 
84 Diana Golobay, BofA First to Join HAMP Program for Second Liens, HousingWire, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.housingwire.com/2010/01/26/
bofa-says-its-first-to-sign-up-for-hamp-second-lien-program.
85 Treasury Continues to Face Implementation Challenges, supra note 67 at 12.
86 Id. at i. 
87 Quarterly Report To Congress (January 26, 2012), supra note 41 at 73.
88 Id. at 14.
89 Id. at 20-21.
90 MHA Handbook, supra note 13 at 106.
91 Id. at 116-117.
92 Key Differences in HAFA Guidelines for Non-GSE, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac Mortgages 1 (2010), http://www.realtor.org/wps/wcm/
connect/aff82b0043f0ce46b2a0fb34cafa6d66/gov_aff_hafa_mortgage_guidelines_0910.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=aff82b0043f0ce4
6b2a0fb34cafa6d66.
93 Treasury Continues to Face Implementation Challenges, supra note 67 at i.
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of 2011.94  One reason for the slow start is unduly program restrictions.  For example, even 
if borrowers have already identified a potential buyer for a short sale, they are still required 
to be evaluated for a first-lien modification.  Borrowers may have difficulty submitting all 
of the proper documentation required for HAMP, such as verification of income, which is 
much more stringent than the typical short sale.  Documentation aside, the additional time 
required for a HAMP evaluation might dissuade the buyer from purchasing the property.  In 
late December 2010, eight months after implementation and 17 months after introduction, 
the Treasury finally updated HAFA guidance to no longer require a HAMP evaluation.95
Another initial problem with HAFA was restrictive short-sale requirements.  For 
example, the guidelines required a property to not be vacant for more than 90 days before 
the short sale agreement.  The guidelines also specified that the only valid reason for a 
property to be vacant is if the borrower has located more than 100 miles away to accept 
new employment.96  In late December 2010, the Treasury extended the vacancy period to 12 
months and eliminated the requirement that the borrower moved to accept employment. 
Additionally, in order to be eligible HAFA guidelines require the mortgage insurer to waive 
any right to collect additional sums from the borrower.97  This requirement has prevented 
some HAFA short sales from going through because of the challenge of obtaining approval 
from insurers.  Depending on the coverage agreement and proceeds from the sale, the 
mortgage insurer could be responsible for paying the investor all or part of the losses 
incurred.  Thus, there is no real incentive for the insurer to waive the borrower’s personal 
liability.  
D.  Principal Reduction Alternative (PRA)
  
Also slow to get off the ground has been the Principal Reduction Alternative (PRA) 
program.  PRA offers financial incentives to investors who agree to forgive principal for 
borrowers whose homes are significantly underwater.98  PRA was announced in March of 
2010, but not implemented until October 2010.  $2 billion is allocated towards the program, 
but it is unclear how much of that money will ultimately be used because PRA incentives 
are paid annually after 12 months of successful performance of the modified mortgage.99 
By the end of 2011, only $8.8 million in incentives has been paid out.100  Moreover, specific 
guidance for the NPV model used in PRA was not provided until October 2010, the month 
that PRA became effective.  As a result of servicers’ need to update internal systems, actual 
implementation did not occur until a later point in time.101
PRA guidelines require servicers to consider principal reduction for any HAMP-eligible 
borrowers with MLTV (mark-to-market loan to value ratio, which is the unpaid principal 
balance divided by property value at time of modification) greater than 115 percent.  For 
example, if a home is currently worth $100,000, a borrower with an unpaid principal balance 
greater than $115,000 would qualify.  The principal forgiveness occurs in increments over 
a three-year period, assuming borrowers remain current on their payments.  Investors are 
paid anywhere from $0.06 to $0.21 for each dollar of principal reduction, depending on the 
MLTV range and delinquency status of the loan.102
However, all that the guidelines require is that servicers consider principal forgiveness, 
not actually offer it.  Even if the NPV value to modify the loan is greater when the principal 
94 Quarterly Report To Congress (January 26, 2012), supra note 41 at 71.
95  Id. at 16.
96  Id.
97  Id. at 17.
98  MHA Handbook, supra note 13 at 67-68.
99  Treasury Continues to Face Implementation Challenges, supra note 67 at 18. 
100  Quarterly Report To Congress (January 26, 2012), supra note 41 at 69.
101  Id. at 21.
102    Home Affordable Modification Program: Modification of Loans with Principal Reduction Alternative (PRA) 3 (2010), https://
www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/praoverviewnongse.pdf.
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is forgiven, servicers are not obligated to do anything.  Half of the servicers that the GAO 
spoke with indicated that they would limit the conditions under which they would offer 
principal forgiveness.  So, while there were over 842,000 active permanent and trial HAMP 
modifications as of December 2011, there were only around 56,000 active permanent and trial 
PRA modifications.103  Perhaps aware of the program’s relative ineffectiveness, the Obama 
administration announced in January 2012 that the financial incentives to investors would 
be tripled to between $0.18 and $0.63.104  Another problem with PRA is that the HAMP NPV 
model does not use an LTV that reflects both first and second liens.105  As a result, the NPV 
model might underestimate the likelihood of redefault by not using the combined LTV.  Not 
taking second liens into account would also underestimate the population of underwater 
borrowers. 
II.  Servicer Motivations
 The run-up to the foreclosure crisis saw the rapid expansion of large pools of securitized 
mortgages.  With this has come conflicts of interest between borrowers, servicers, and 
investors and helps to explain why the number of modifications pales in comparison to 
foreclosures.  Most securitization agreements (pooling and servicing agreements, or PSAs) 
specify a master servicer to be responsible for collecting and processing payments on 
mortgage loans.106  These pools are governed by interlocking tax and accounting rules.  These 
rules do not forbid loan modifications; however, some of the rules restrict circumstances in 
which loans can be modified or create disincentives to do them.107  
Probably the principal reason that mortgage servicers are reluctant to modify loans is 
that foreclosures are actually profitable for them.  Once a loan is more than 90 days overdue, 
servicers charge processing and foreclosure fees as well as costs for attorneys, appraisers, 
and other services.108  Often, these fees have incredibly high mark-ups.109  In addition, 
servicers also collect a monthly late fee that can run as high as five percent of the mortgage 
payment.  For example, a foreclosure on a $200,000 mortgage might generate $10,000 or 
more in income for servicers.110  When a foreclosure is concluded, these servicers get paid 
before mortgage investors.  So, while the investors might take a loss from a foreclosure, 
the servicers will make a handsome profit.  It is not hard to see why the $2,000 (originally 
$1,000) incentive offered to servicers for loan modifications through HAMP has failed to be 
a big enough carrot.  By modifying and retaining the loans, they are just earning a small fee 
every month, which could take a decade or more to make up for the amount they could earn 
in the short-term foreclosures.  Servicers typically earn between one-tenth and one-half of a 
percentage point of the loan’s balance for administering the accounts.111  Modifications also 
require significant staffing.  According to the servicing industry, the costs attributable to 
performing a modification are between $750 and $1,000.112  Thus, servicers have an incentive 
to push borrowers into late payments and draw out foreclosures for as long as possible. 
Another possible reason for the low number of modifications is because the servicing 
industry is overwhelmed with defaults.  The servicing industry was designed to deal 
100,000 to 200,000 defaulted loans a year.  Currently, they are handling upwards of four 
103  Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report Through December 2011, supra note 23.
104  Prior, supra note 50.
105 Treasury Continues to Face Implementation Challenges, supra note 67 at 19.
106 National Consumer Law Center, Why Servicers Foreclose When They Should Modify and Other Puzzles of Servicer Behavior: Servicer 
Compensation and its Consequences Report 3 (2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mortgage_servicing/servicer-re-
port1009.pdf.
107 Id. at 5.
108 Kathleen M. Howley, Mortgage Servicer Profits May Threaten Obama Housing Programs, Bloomberg Businessweek, Apr. 21, 2010, http://
www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-21/mortgage-servicer-profits-may-threaten-obama-housing-programs.html.
109 National Consumer Law Center, supra note 128, at 17.
110 Howley, supra note 137.
111 Id.
112 National Consumer Law Center, supra note 128 at 27.
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million.113  Simply put, the infrastructure is just not in place to handle the loans.  
As for the lenders themselves, there are two main reasons why they are reluctant to 
modify.  First is the self-cure possibility; more than 30 percent of seriously delinquent 
borrowers cure without receiving a modification.114  Thus, lenders are discouraged from 
modifying when a significant percentage of borrowers will simply make up the missed 
payments on their own.  Second is the redefault risk; up to 45 percent of borrowers who 
receive modifications are back in serious delinquency within six months.115  In essence, the 
lender has simply postponed foreclosure.  And, in an era of falling home prices, the lender 
will now ultimately recover less.
III.  Possible Solutions
A.  Cramdown
One potential solution to the foreclosure crisis is to amend bankruptcy law to allow 
judges to write down the value of a primary mortgage in Chapter 13, bifurcating it into 
secured and unsecured portions.  This is a practice called “lien stripping,” more colloquially 
known as a “cramdown.”116  A bankruptcy judge would reduce the balance of the secured 
claim to the current market value of the house, and turn the remaining balance into an 
unsecured claim.  Lien-stripping is already allowed on other consumer debt, including 
rental properties and vacation homes.  Essentially, then, current bankruptcy laws actually 
afford relief to affluent borrowers that less affluent borrowers cannot receive; a person with 
three homes can receive lien-stripping on two of those homes, while a person with only one 
home receives nothing.  To understand the consequences of lien-stripping, it is illustrative 
to look at an analogous situation from the past.
Quite similar to today’s crisis, in the 1970’s many farmers used variable-rate notes, 
underwriting standards eased, and a speculative bubble occurred.  When that bubble burst 
in 1981, many farmers found themselves underwater.117  Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy 
Code barred farmers from modifying debt secured by a primary residence, just as it does 
to homeowners today.  Chapter 11 bankruptcy, designed for corporations, gave creditors 
legal means to block cramdowns.  Also quite similar to the current situation, voluntary 
modification efforts subsidized by the government did not lead agricultural lenders to 
negotiate modifications.  As a result, Congress in 1986 created Chapter 12, which allowed 
judges to restructure the farmers mortgages.118 
This, however, was not without controversy.  Critics of lien-stripping argued that it 
would spur many borrowers to declare bankruptcy, which would bog down the courts and 
make credit more expensive.  In other words, it would result in higher interest rates that 
would make home ownership less affordable to low- and middle-income families.  These 
are the same arguments used against lien-stripping today.  These fears would prove to be 
unfounded.  A 1989 GAO report found that after the creation of Chapter 12, no bankers 
raised interest rates to farmers more than 50 basis points.  As this was consistent with 
increasing premiums due to the economic environment, this suggests that creation of the 
Chapter 12 lien-stripping did little to alter the cost and availability of farm credit.119  What 
did change, however, was the lenders willingness to negotiate modifications now that 
they faced the threat of lien-stripping.  In fact, the GAO report states that while 30,000 
113 Howley, supra note 137.
114 Adelino, Gerardi, & Willen, supra note 136 at 26.
115 Id.
116 Drowning or waiving: The policy options for alleviating America’s huge negative-equity problem, supra note 6.
117 Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & James B. Thomson, Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Stripdowns and Bankruptcy: Lessons from Agricultural 
Bankruptcy Reform (2010), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2010/2010-9.cfm.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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bankruptcy filings were anticipated in the first year, only 8,500 were filed in the first two 
years.120  Thus, the agricultural crisis of the 1980’s has shown us that lien-stripping poses a 
viable solution with nary any negative side-effects.  Critics would still argue, however, that 
the lending market has changed considerably and also that judges are not as qualified as 
bankers to make mortgage modification decisions. 
B.  Principal Reduction
A foreclosed home typically sells for 35 percent below the mortgage value, compared to 
only 13 percent below when an underwater borrower sells on their own.121  Lenders are the 
ones that bear the brunt of the higher losses in foreclosure.  It would be beneficial to both 
the lender and the borrower to write down the loan to a value above the likely foreclosure 
price.  There is the moral hazard problem, though; borrowers, regardless of their ability to 
pay, would deliberately miss payments in order to get their loans adjusted.  One way this 
could be addressed would be with a “contingent write-down.”  Loans would be written 
down in increments over a period of time, such as three years, but only if the borrower 
stays current on their payments.122 Another approach is a “shared appreciation” scheme. 
Principal reductions would be combined with an equity stake for lenders.123  Subsequent 
price increases that result in equity gains would be split between borrowers and lenders 
once the home is sold.  
Another variation of the “shared appreciation” scheme is for the government to attain 
an equity stake in the property as opposed to the lender.  There is already precedent for 
this in the form of the “HOPE for Homeowners Act.”  Despite this Act failing miserably 
to actually help homeowners, as discussed earlier, it does provide a model for how such 
a “shared appreciation” scheme could work.  Under the Act, the equity created by the 
write-down of the mortgage to less than the appraised fair market value of the property 
belongs 100 percent to the government in the first year.  This equity percentage is reduced 
ten percent per year.124  The equity created by subsequent appreciation in market value in 
excess of the appraised fair market value at the time of the write-down is divided 50-50 
between the government and the homeowner.125  
The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 (1987 Act) also provides precedent for mandating 
write-downs outside of bankruptcy.126  The 1987 Act provided loan restructuring requirements 
for certain Farm Credit System (FCS) and Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) loans. 
The 1987 Act required the FCS and FmHA to notify each delinquent borrower that they 
could apply for restructuring.  After a borrower applied, the agencies would analyze each 
loan to determine if the government’s net recovery on a restructured loan would exceed the 
government’s recovery through foreclosure.  If this was the case, then the government was 
required to restructure.  This included both debt write-down as well as debt write-off for 
borrowers in more dire straits.127 
While the 1987 Act allowed farmers to attain principal reduction without the stigma 
of bankruptcy (it was passed just one year after the creation of Chapter 12), it was not 
without controversy.  In fiscal year 1989 alone, FmHA wrote off $1.3 billion attributable 
to the 1987 Act.128   Some of these very large write-downs were in excess of $1 million and 
120 Id.
121 Drowning or waiving: The policy options for alleviating America’s huge negative-equity problem, supra note 6.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 12 U.S.C.A. ‘ 1715z-23k(1)(A)-(E).
125 Id. at 1715z-23k(1)(F).
126 7 U.S.C.A. ‘ 2001 et seq.
127  Gov’t Accountability Office, Farmer’s Home Administration’s Farm Loan Programs 23-24 (1992), http://archive.gao.gov/d36t11/148219.
pdf, [hereinafter Farmer’s Home Administration’s Farm Loan Programs].
128  Gov’t Accountability Office, Financial Audit: Farmer’s Home Administration’s Financial Statements for 1989 and 1988 9 (1991) http://
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generated negative press.129  The GAO also reported in 1990 that 18 of 30 non-delinquent 
borrowers they interviewed felt penalized for paying their debts and some were thinking 
about becoming delinquent so that they could qualify for debt reduction.130  This criticism 
led to the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 (FACT Act).131  Under 
the FACT Act, write-downs were limited to a lifetime amount of $300,000.  The 1987 Act’s 
effectiveness is also questionable, as 43 percent of the loans that were restructured between 
1988 and 1990 (9,500 borrowers) became delinquent again.132  In addition, between 1989 and 
1992 the GAO identified 6,222 borrowers who received multiple debt restructures.
An extreme variation of principal reduction is evident in a plan advocated by Yale 
economist John Geanakoplos.  The key to the plan is to reduce the principal of the loan 
to below the current value of the house but above the value the note-holder could get by 
foreclosing.133
This would give the homeowner equity again.  Equity, in turn, would increase the 
homeowner’s motivation to stay in their home.  The bondholders, meanwhile, would 
maintain a steady income stream and would not lose as much money as they would 
through foreclosure.  The subprime bond market trades as if it expects only 25 percent back 
on a loan when there is a foreclosure.  Therefore, it would not cost the bondholders any 
money by lowering the principal because they have already taken the loss. In the aggregate, 
communities would benefit from fewer foreclosures in the area, leading to fewer houses for 
sale and thus less downward pressure on housing prices. 
 The program would be limited to borrowers who are current on their mortgages. 
Otherwise, homeowners are incentivized to fall behind on their payments. Additionally, 
homeowners with good credit scores typically value their good credit and would be more 
apt to continue making regular payments and not become delinquent.  The plan is estimated 
to only cost between three and five billion dollars over three years.
C.  Direct Payments
Another radical idea is that instead of offering money to lenders in order to goad them 
into offering modifications, simply give that money directly to homeowners.134  Under this 
plan there would be no problem with servicer incentives to foreclose.  Additionally, by not 
relying on a voluntary program, all of the $75 billion allocated to HAMP could actually be 
used, instead of the current $800 million of that amount being spent.  This would certainly 
be a way to help out the broadest swath of the public.  There would still be potential issues, 
though.  Cutting a check directly to a homeowner would not guarantee that the money 
actually be used to make the mortgage payments.  Perhaps it would be better to send the 
money to servicers on behalf of the homeowners.  Another problem is that this proposal 
is vague and does not suggest which specific borrowers would receive money.  So, the 
same moral hazards of motivating borrowers to default and helping out those who made 
the worst choices still arise.  Additionally, in the long run this plan would not help out the 
millions of Americans severely underwater.
129 James T. Massey, Farmers Home Administration and Farm Credit System Update, 73 Neb. L. Rev. 187, 196 (1994).
130  Farmer’s Home Administration’s Farm Loan Programs, supra note 161 at 24.
131 Massey, supra note 165; Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359.
132  Farmer’s Home Administration’s Farm Loan Programs, supra note 161 at 24-25.
133 John D. Geanakoplos & Susan P. Koniak, Op-Ed., Matters of Principal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/
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134 Jennifer B. McKim, Lenders avoid redoing loans, Fed concludes, The Boston Globe, July 7, 2009, http://www.boston.com/realestate/news/
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VI.  The Best Solution
A.  Ideal
The best solution to the foreclosure crisis is no solution.  Foreclosing rapidly is vital 
to clearing the market.  The economy will suffer as long as there is excessive real estate 
debt and capital is tied up in non-performing assets.  A foreclosure freeze only extends the 
time that the loans go unpaId.  The same can be said of a program like HAMP, which has 
cancelled more trial modifications than it has converted into permanent ones.  In essence, 
HAMP strung along a majority of its participants and only delayed foreclosure. Despite 
helping some borrowers, HAMP merely spreads the foreclosure crisis over several years.  
More than half the mortgages in the U.S. are insured by the federal government, leaving 
taxpayers on the hook.  In the 23 states that permit judicial foreclosure, various forms of 
moratoriums are now in place.135  U.S. properties foreclosed in the fourth quarter of 2011 
took an average of 348 days to complete the foreclosure process,.136  A primary reason is 
that the system is already so clogged.  Those that fight the eviction can last even longer, 
although they are unlikely to recover their homes even in the event of bad documentation.137 
Delaying foreclosures and allowing delinquent borrowers to live in their former homes for 
free is a cost borne by all taxpayers. 
Experts seem to agree that foreclosures need to occur in order for the economy to 
improve.  In September of 2010, the chief economist at Moody’s Analytics predicted that a 
housing recovery would be underway by the third quarter of 2011.138  After the foreclosure 
scandal began that winter and foreclosures came to a halt, he revised his prediction to 
indicate that the housing recovery could be delayed another few years.  U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner has said that a settlement between banks and U.S. authorities 
over foreclosure abuses needs to be reached quickly in order to help the housing market 
heal.139  Karl Case, co-creator of the Case-Shiller index, has labeled anything that slows the 
foreclosure process a “bad thing.”140 
B.  Realistic - Guiding Principles
While doing nothing might make the most economic sense, it might not make the most 
political sense.  Both lawmakers and the President do not want to be blamed by millions of 
people for losing their homes during the next election.  Therefore, taking no action might be 
politically untenable.  However, if action is going to be taken, it should be the right action. 
Clearly, HAMP was not the right action.  
I propose the following guidelines for any attempt at halting the foreclosure crisis. 
The major underlying principle is that we should help out those with the most skin in the 
game.  Everyone who did the responsible thing and put down the traditional 20 percent 
down payment should be helped before anyone who put down hardly any of their own 
money.  Another principle is that we should help out those who actually need and deserve 
the help.  In the era of loose or, in many cases, non-existent underwriting standards, 
countless “liar loans” were made to borrowers who had no realistic chance of ever paying 
back the mortgage.  Yes, the often predatory lenders are culpable for this mess, but so are 
the homeowners; two wrongs do not make a right.  Someone who can no longer afford 
135 Jane Bryant Quinn, The Foreclosure Mills: How This Could Really Hurt the Housing Market, CBS MoneyWatch, Oct. 4, 2010, http://
moneywatch.bnet.com/investing/blog/make-money/the-foreclosure-mills-how-this-could-really-hurt-the-housing-market/511/.
136 2011 Year-End Foreclosure Report: Foreclosures on the Retreat, supra note 4.
137 Quinn, supra note 175.
138 Michelle Conlin, Foreclosure freeze could undermine housing market, Yahoo! Finance, Oct. 11, 2010, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
Foreclosure-freeze-could-apf-3924319052.html.
139  Dave Clarke & Rachelle Younglai, Geithner seeks swift foreclosure pact with banks, Reuters, Mar. 15, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/03/15/us-financial-regulation-mortgages-idUSTRE72A63J20110315.
140 Conlin, supra note 178.
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their payments because of job loss should be helped over someone who kept their job but 
cannot afford their payment simply because their “teaser” interest rate increased, which is 
something they knew was going to happen and should have been planned for.  
Keeping with this principle, speculators should not receive any help whatsoever. They 
speculated, and they lost.  They knew the risks.  The same goes for any second-homes. 
So, only primary residences should qualify.  There should also be a cap - the owner of a 
$100,000 home should be helped before someone who owns a $2 million dollar house.  The 
$760,000 upper loan limit of HAMP seems fair.  
Another problem to avoid is the moral hazard of homeowners purposely defaulting 
in order to qualify for a program.  So, only borrowers who are current on their payments 
should qualify.  At the same time, it would be unfair to exclude a distressed borrower who 
defaulted for the first time right before the announcement of a program; this would leave 
out many deserving homeowners.  Perhaps it would be better to provide a “grace period” 
of sorts - as long as a homeowner has been current in the previous three months, they 
would be eligible.
Any successful plan would have to deal with the negative equity problem.  Simply 
reducing monthly payments for someone who was hundreds of thousands of dollars 
underwater makes little economic sense unless the goal is to help out lenders, not borrowers. 
Strategic defaults are on the rise, and will probably continue to rise as frustrations grow 
and people spread the word about how the consequences are not as severe as one would 
think. It is clear that for any plan to have a chance it succeeding, it cannot be voluntary.  As 
discussed earlier, servicers have too high of an incentive to foreclose.  A 2009 report from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York used statistical analysis to determine the impact of 
LTV on mortgage modification success.  The authors analyzed the effects of a modification 
resulting in a ten percent reduction in monthly payment on mortgages with various LTV 
ratios.  Compared to a modified mortgage with at least ten percent positive equity, a 
modified mortgage with an LTV between 100 and 104 has a predicted re-default rate that 
is 4.6 percentage points higher.  For a modified mortgage with an LTV greater than 115, the 
re-default rate climbs to 33 percentage points higher.141  In other words, being significantly 
underwater significantly increases the chances that a homeowner will walk away even after 
a sizeable modification. 
The authors used their model to illustrate the example of a homeowner whose current 
LTV is 118 percent on a $200,000 loan under two different modification scenarios.  In the first 
scenario, the monthly payment is lowered by reducing the interest rate from 9.17 percent to 
6.29 percent so the debt to income ratio is reduced from 40 to 31 percent.  This is essentially 
what a HAMP modification would achieve, and the report estimated that this would lower 
the re-default rate over the first year by 10.8 percent.142  In the second scenario, the principal is 
written down so that the LTV drops from 118 to 100 percent. To achieve the desired monthly 
debt to income ratio of 31 percent, the interest rate is then reduced from 9.17 percent to 7.95 
percent.  The impact of this combination approach is estimated to lower the re-default risk by 
40 percentage points, meaning it is nearly four times as effective as the interest only strategy.143 
Now comes the issue of who to help.  Widespread reducing of outstanding principal for 
underwater homeowners would immediately draw the ire, though, of those homeowners 
who are not underwater.  This group would include mostly borrowers whose home values 
have fallen yet still retain positive equity, and those few whose home values remained 
relatively constant.  Their gripe would essentially be that the people who made the worst 
investments are the ones getting help (although, to be fair, certainly some homeowners 
were in fact responsible yet ended up simply victims of circumstance due to the markets 
that they lived in).  Relatively, the borrowers with positive equity would be punished with 
141 Haughwout, Okah, & Tracy, supra note 81 at 23.
142 Id. at 24-25.
143 Id.
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a lack of a subsidy for making a better investment.  This complaint would be valId.  One 
way around this could be to provide some form of principal forgiveness to those who 
bought homes in the last few years that are not underwater.  However, this would mean 
that there would then be less money to help out those who are underwater, and thus more 
foreclosures would occur.  Effectiveness would be traded off for fairness.  This might in 
turn spark complaints from those who bought their homes more than a few years ago and 
would receive no assistance.  However, it would simply not be tenable to subsidize every 
single mortgage in the country.  The line would have to be drawn somewhere. 
Ultimately, this issue just shows the wisdom of doing nothing and letting the foreclosures 
clear the market on their own.  But, assuming that something will be done, the reality is 
that there will be winners and losers in terms of who gets help and how much.  In essence, 
no matter which method is chosen, the ones who made the good investments would be the 
ones subsidizing those who made the bad investments. Fundamentally, however, this is not 
much different from our progressive income tax system or welfare, and it is a reality that 
the public will simply have to accept. 
C.  Realistic - Plan Specifics
My specific plan would be called the Financial Assistance Incentives for Responsible 
Homeowners (FAIR) Act.  Specifically, through federal funding FAIR would provide 
principal reduction and, if necessary, interest rate reduction, to borrowers who need and 
deserve help.  To be eligible for assistance under the FAIR Act, borrowers’ combined LTV 
ratio at the time of their home purchase must have been 80 percent or below; in other 
words, they must have put down at minimum 20 percent when purchasing.  The initial loan 
must not have been for an amount in excess of $760,000.  Combined with the 80 percent LTV 
requirement, this means that only homes worth less than $950,000 at purchase are eligible. 
The home must be the primary residence; second-homes are ineligible.  
FAIR would be available for those current on their mortgage, as well as borrowers who 
are delinquent for no more than three months prior to the announcement of FAIR.  If the 
borrowers’ monthly debt-to-income ratio is already less than 31 percent, they are ineligible 
for assistance.  For example, if a borrower’s monthly income is $5,000, their mortgage 
payment would need to already be above $1,550 in order to qualify.  If a borrowers’ family 
income is more than 4.5 times greater than the federal poverty line, they are also ineligible 
for assistance.  For example, the current federal poverty level for a family of 4 is $23,050.144 
So, if the income of that family is greater than $103,725, they would not be eligible for 
assistance. 
FAIR would be available to all homeowners with a current LTV ratio greater than 100 
percent. For qualified homeowners, the principal would be reduced to the current fair 
market value of the home, leaving the LTV ratio at 100 percent.  After this, if the monthly 
debt to income ratio is still above 31 percent, the interest rate would be lowered in order to 
achieve this threshold.   However, the interest rate could not fall lower than the interest rate 
for a 30-year Treasury bond at the date of the modification.  As of April 2012, this is around 
3.3 percent.145  
The purpose of FAIR is to encourage homeowners to stay in their homes, not flip them 
for a quick profit, so 100 percent of any equity attained in the first year after the principal 
reduction would belong to the investor if the home is sold.  If the home is sold during the 
second year, 75 percent of the equity would go to the investor and the homeowner would 
keep 25 percent.  After two years, a more complex shared appreciation scheme begins.  For 
appreciation between 100 and 110 percent of the fair market value at the time of reduction, 
144 The 2012 HHS Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/12poverty.shtml.
145  Daily  Treasury  Yield  Curve  Rates,  http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.
aspx?data=yield (last visited on April 6, 2012).
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the investor would keep 75 percent and the homeowner would keep 25 percent.  For 
appreciation between 110 and 125 percent of the fair market value, the investor would keep 
65 percent and the homeowner would keep 35 percent.  All appreciation over 125 percent is 
evenly split between the homeowner and the investor. Thus, the homeowner would have 
an incentive to stay in the house for a long period of time, because the longer he or she stays 
the more equity he or she gets to share in.
FAIR would not be voluntary - servicers would be required to reduce the principal. 
FAIR would apply to all loans, whether held privately or by a GSE.  The loss would be 
borne by the owner of the loan.  For example, losses on Fannie Mae- and Freddie Mac-
owned loans would be borne by them, i.e. the federal government.  Losses on mortgage-
backed securities would be borne by the investors.  However, considering that a lender 
might lose even more money by foreclosing, FAIR is not that unfair.  There would be a 
national hotline to call to complain about uncooperative or fraudulent servicers, and there 
would be stiff penalties if a servicer is found to have not reduced principal when they 
were required to.  Specifically, the penalty would be five times the amount of the particular 
principle reduction.  
FAIR would also address all junior liens (except judgment liens).  Second liens would 
be written down at twice the percentage the first lien is written down. Third liens would 
be reduced by three times the percentage the first lien is written down. A fourth lien would 
be reduced 100 percent; in other words, it would be extinguished.  Junior liens are by their 
very nature more risky, so that is why under FAIR they stand to lose more than first liens. 
In many cases, though, juniors would actually fare better under FAIR because if the home 
is foreclosed on then the junior liens would be completely extinguished and there would 
undoubtedly be no surplus to pay them off (and going after the borrower might prove 
difficult or impossible).  Just like with first liens, writing down of second liens would be 
mandatory and any failure to do so would result in a penalty five times the amount of the 
particular reduction.  
  There is one caveat to FAIR - there simply might not be many underwater 
homeowners who actually put down 20 percent when purchasing.  If the number of eligible 
homeowners is found to be sufficiently low, then the required initial LTV ratio should be 
adjusted downward to 75 percent (and possibly even 70 percent).  If that is the case, then 
the maximum initial loan amount would be adjusted accordingly to $712,500 and $665,000, 
respectively, in order to maintain the $950,000 value at purchase limit.  Alternatively, it 
might be more palatable to define a goal of how many homeowners the government wishes 
to help, and then use that number to approximate the cutoff LTV ratio to achieve that goal. 
Or the government could also allocate a set dollar amount of debt it wishes to eliminate, 
and approximate the proper LTV ratio that way.  
 
V.  Conclusion
HAMP and its companion programs have been largely a failure.  The fundamental 
flaw is the program’s notion that borrowers will continue to make payments no matter 
how severely underwater they are, as strategic defaults are on the rise.  And by making the 
program voluntary and offering only minimal compensation ensured that only a minimal 
amount of homeowners would receive help.  The fact that the administration had to double 
the incentives to banks after a year indicates that a voluntary system in which banks are free 
not to participate was not nearly forceful enough.  In addition, HAMP and the companion 
programs have been hampered by a lack of clear guidelines and quality assurance.  Because 
of the incentives of servicers to foreclose, any successful plan to mitigate foreclosures would 
have to be mandatory and deal with the negative equity problem.  Ideally, though, the 
sooner foreclosures go through the sooner the housing market will be able to recover, so 
the best solution would be no solution.  However, if a solution must be put forth, it should 
make sure to reward the prudent over the profligate.  
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